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A MACROHISTORIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY
ON THE IDEA OF EAST AND WEST
FROM HERODOTUS TO EDWARD SAID
DAVID KOPF

The Encounter Between East and West
In Myth and History
The idea or myth of encounter between an Orient and an Occident has
been a major theme in macrohistory. Unfortunately, the theme has
seldom been treated autonomously in an historiographical sense or as the
history of the idea of East and West in historical writings. For centuries,
historians and historical popularizers have been so emotionally involved
in their allegations about the "Orient", "Orientals" and "Orientalism",
for example, that they have rarely, if at all, detached the subject from
their assumptions about race, religion, social evolution and the scale of
civilization. From our own more liberated perspective of comparative
history, it is astonishing how the great thinkers of the past were, on the
matter of East and West, blind to the quality and degree of influence on
their thought by the nation and time in which they lived.
With the rise of new nations in the East, accompanied by renaissances
which have justified their integrity as cultures, the theme of Orient and
Occident has moved into a new dimension of encounter. The older idea
has consistently been exposed as a myth propagated by Westerners
imbued with an exaggerated sense of cultural self-importance and global
dominance. Has the shift in power differential prompted the Asian
intelligentsia to conceive a radically new approach to the older polarity?
Or do we find it in its familiar Procrustean bed of partisan politics and
rank ethnocentrism? Has Rudyard Kipling simply been displaced by
Edward Said?
In the following pages, I make a modest but determined effort to
explore the landscape of the East-West heritage in the deep dark waters of
our historical past. There is not the slightest intention, in this brief essay,
to give a comprehensive history of the idea in historical literature. The
project is, no doubt, a commendable undertaking. But the purpose, here,
is to offer macrohistorians and other kinds of comparativists, an introducPublished by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1986
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tory analytical survey of the encounter by an historian of Asia who has
studied the problem comprehensively for at least fifteen years.
The Uses of the Idea as Myth from
Herodotus to Kipling
Most discussions on the origin of the East and West dichotomy have
begun with Herodotus (484 to 425 B.C.). In his Histories, the encounter
was between Greece, which represented Europe, and Persia which represented Asia. Herodotus, himself, never went beyond these two geopolitical and civilizational structures. He had little to say about India and
nothing to say about China.
But later generations of Western intellectuals had a good deal to say
about Herodotus on the subject of what divided East from West. They
found or read into his largely descriptive prose the genesis of an idea that
Greek civic virtue was sharply in contrast to Oriental despotism. On the
other hand, some modern historians blame Herodotus and Aristotle,
among the Greeks, for inventing these dubious claims about their own
superiority. ' Other historians attribute the myth of East and West to
Herodotus and his lively imagination which too often was substituted for
historical accuracy." William Lockwood has pointed out that "Arnold
Toynbee dismisses the whole dichotomy between Asia and Europe as
nothing but a myth invented by Herodotus, who claimed that the Persians
made war on the Greeks to avenge Troy (which they never heard of) "
Nevertheless, as Toynbee was only too well aware, from Herodotus to
our own century, countless generations of historians rarely approached
Eurasia as a unity, preferring instead to view Asia and Europe as two
diametrically opposed systems. In large part, no doubt, this persistent
attitude of a polarized world order was a reflection of a never ending
military struggle between Europeans, on the one hand, and Parthians,
Sassanids, Arabs and Ottomans, on the other.
But in terms of intercivilizational encounter, it is not too clear how and
why great ideas or great men, for instance, became the historic property
of Occident or Orient. Somehow, Alexander became a Western hero and
Hellenization the precursor of contemporary Westernization.'' Bactria, a
successor state to Alexander's empire, has been treated by historians as a
Western outpost on India's northwest frontier; the Kushanas who carried
the Bactrian heritage to its ultimate development, also on India's northwest frontier, are considered Orientals.' Buddha and Christ had so much
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in common as charismatic leaders of salvation ideologies, that their
sacred biographies are almost idential in places. Also, it is impossible to
this very day to know who borrowed what from whom. Moreover,
Buddhism and Christianity had much in common concerning monasticism and other-worldiness. And yet, Christianity had been appropriated
as "Western", Buddhism as "Oriental."
One must be reminded that these were not geographical comparisons
but value judgments on what were held to be two distinctly different
civilizational monoliths. It mattered little to the Western historians,
professional and popular, that Islam was closely akin to the JudeoChristian tradition, that Rome actually survived until the mid-fifteenth
century as Byzantium, that China was more technologically advanced
than Europe until the Industrial Age, or that Indo-Europeans in Iran and
India were linguistically and ethnically derived from the same tribal
cluster as were the Greeks, Romans and Germans.
My own impression is that this Berlin Wall of East-West encounter
was constructed after the establishment of Western dominance in Asia. It
was built on a foundation of implicit assumptions on the Orient and built
from an ever increasing supply of stereotypical images of "Asiatick"
cultures. I am not suggesting that there were not many cases of authentic
contributions by sympathetic European scholars to Asian studies or that
all the stereotypes by Western intellecturals on Asia were necessarily
negative. The history of pre-Muslim Hindu and Buddhist civilizations in
India may never have been rediscovered but for the work of British
Orientalists such as William Jones, H.T. Colebrooke, H.H. Wilson and
James Prinsep. There were also the Voltairs and Schopenhauers who
built their favorable misconceptions of the East on positive stereotypes.
The fact is that by the late nineteenth century when Western imperialism had reached its highest point of far reaching power and dominance in the world, the idea of East-West encounter had become one of
those sacred myths which no comparative historian would dare challenge . The question is whether there were many dispassionate and honest
comparativists about in European intellectual circles who were not true
believers in Western superiority. According to Alex Aronson who has
done a thorough study of this very problem during this very period, the
most gifted European intellectuals continually "made statements of a
most misleading kind about the supposed relationship between East and
West." The following quotation, caustic but true, deserves careful
consideration because it deals with an aspect of Western thought too often
ignored in Western intellectual thinking:
3
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An instance . . . is Maeterlink's famous statement about the Eastern and the
Western lobe in man's mental makeup. . . . The Western lobe produces reason,
science, consciousness; the other secretes intuition, religion, the subconscious. . . . It is out of such an attitude that arise those amazing schemes, built up
with all the pedantry of European scholarship, concerning the racial superiority of
the 'Aryans', as in Gobineau, the superiority of the 'Teutons', as in H.S.
Chamberlain, the 'senility' of Indian civilization, as in Hegel, or of Buddhism, as
in Spengler. . . . Once their thesis was established, all they had to do was to
apply it, point by point, to what they considered to be 'reality'. Their ignorance
which at times was appalling, could always be hidden behind a veil of cynical
condescension masquerading as scholarship. . . .
s

Aronson has little to say about the dozens of outstanding European
scholars studying Asian philology, archeology, mythology and religion
simply because they have little impact outside of academia except possibly on Asians themselves. Aronson's concern has been with the influential image-makers among such philosopher kings as Goethe,
Schopenhauer, Hegel and Nietzsche. I am inclined to accept Aronson's
generalizations that not a single one of these comparative world
philosophers ever used Asia any more than as a means to advancing a
philosophic argument about Europe's past, present or future.
Nietzsche is perhaps an excellent illustration. He incorporated earlier
views on the East held by Goethe, Schopenhauer and Hegel, as well as by
Gobineau. He was also familiar with Indian scholarship through his
relationship with Paul Deussen, the respected Indologist and author of
The System of the Vedanta (1883).
What was Nietzsche's conception of the Orient and how did he use it in
his philosophy? The answer to the first part of the question is that he had
no conception of the East and that his Orient was simply a collection of
stereotypes of "Aryan" India and Iran. As for the second part of the
question, since he believed in salvation by means of the warrior-type
superman who was beyond good and evil, he identified with the popular
contemporary German image of the Brahman caste being a survival of the
pure Aryan race which had conquered the world with its military daring
and skill. In this context, Nietzsche accepted Gobineau's golden age
vision of a pure-blooded Aryan race whose achievements were due to a
superior social organization and code of behavior.
But Europeans living in an age of Western dominance, were only too
aware of the decline and fall of Indian civilization. Voltaire blamed it on
Western commercial avarice long before Karl Marx appeared on the
scene; Gobineau saw India's degeneration in the mixing of the pure
Aryan blood with the inferior blood of the native races. Nietzsche,
6
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misusing Schopenhauer to his own advantage, blamed the Buddhists. He
rejected Buddhism not as an autonomous ideology in an Asian context,
but as an alleged functional equivalent of Christianity which he abhorred
for its life negational tendencies of misguided love and compassion.
Nietzsche's idea of the Orient, was, therefore, a mere footnote in support
of his interpretation of Western history. His idea was both positive and
negative depending on whether he spoke of the Brahmanic superman or
of the corrupting influences of Jesus and Buddha.
The German fascination with India and Iran is interesting since few, if
any, of her poets, philosophers, and even scholars, travelled to either of
these countries. Max Miiller, among the greatest of nineteenth century
Indologists, never set foot on Indian soil. The fact is that the German
nation was a latecomer among imperialist powers, had no territorial
empire in the East nor much of an overseas empire anywhere. The reverse
was true for the British whose sea power had enabled her to filch an
substantial amount of the world's real estate. No other Western nation
had so completely imbibed the imperialist credo as part of its imperialist
image. Even its most well intentioned liberals of the nineteenth century
such as Thomas Babington Macaulay were deeply imbued with visions of
national power and glory. As early as 1835, Macaulay wrote that:
10

The English . . . have spread their dominion over every quarter of the globe . . .
have created a maritime power which would annihilate in a quarter of an hour the
navies of Tyre, Athens, Carthage, Venice, and Genoa together, have carried the
science of healing, the means of locomotion and correspondence, every mechanical art, every manufacture, everything that promotes the commerce of life to a
perfection which our ancestors would have thought magical."

From precisely such outbursts of optimistic fervor was born the mythic
equation that Westernization equals modernization. If the increasingly
industrializing West came to be conceived as modernity personified, the
East gradually sank to a level equivalent to the most technologically
primitive societies or as social scientists called them a century later, the
underdeveloped nations of the Third World. Neither the cosmogonic
myths of golden ages nor the perfect moment of truth achieved by
classical ages satisfied the futuristic projections of Western positivists.
The cyclical view of history was abandoned by the intelligentsia for linear
theories of progress.
The intellectual games played by German philosophers were meaningless to the Macaulays. The Vedas, Upanishads, Vedanta, the heritage of
the Brahmans, Buddhists and Muslims were considered next to nothing
against the promise of the present age. Macaulay put it rather brutally and
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bluntly when he said in his famous Minute on Education in 1835 that "a
single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native
literature of India and Arabia."
Between 1880-1910, or the period Allen Greenberger has called the
"Era of Confidence for British Imperialism," cultural arrogance and
exalted Westernism reached its highest point before the disastrous impact
of World War I. It was the era of Kipling and his contemporaries when
even an ounce of English blood could produce leadership in the least
envied member of any inferior race. It was an era when even Christianity
was organized as a colonial army of salvation and spiritually was measured by the size of one's biceps.
Macaulay, for all his ethnocentricism, still held out the hope of
salvation to the East if Orientals would change their cultural citizenship
and use their new English identity as a passport to modernity. Kipling
was no Macaulay since he represented an imperialist credo that deplored
intercivilizational interpenetration at the same time it denied the efficacy
of Westernizing the inferior Asiatic breeds. The East and West were like
a pyramid, Kipling's race at the apex and the Orientals at the base. Only
the strength of the heroic soldier could bring East and West togther.
Otherwise:
12

13

Oh, East is East and
West is West, and
never the twain shall
meet. . . ,
k

If for Kipling, the British were everything positive, powerful and
progressive, the Indians, as Orientals, were just the opposite. Greenberger has made a careful list of Indian stereotypes gleaned from British
fiction during this period. First, the Indians were made out to be a
childlike race to whom the British were fatherlike authoritarian figures.
"By right of race," says Greenberger, the Briton was the leader and
father and the Indian the follower and child; any attempt to upset this was
to go against the rules of nature."
Secondly, like children, Orientals were "governed by their emotions
rather than by their reason." Thirdly, they were conservatie and as a
culture "do not change, except under pressure from without, and they
disintegrate suddenly." Finally, they were passive and happy in their
passivity, fatalistically so.
To Kipling, the Western educated Indian, generally associated with
the Bengali babu, was both frightening and grotesque, a Frankenstein of
14
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British acculturation policies. Greenberger maintains that what Kipling
feared about Westernized Asians was the process of acculturation itself,
which to him was a sword with two edges, the Westernization of Orientals and the Orientalization of the British. At best, Kipling believed that if
the British kept their racial and cultural characteristics pure they would
make better rulers and would earn the respect of their Indian subjects.
Aloofness, then, might preserve British integrity and the Empire. In the
end, therefore, the British were not so different from the Germans and
other European race theorists. Behind the fear of syncretism was a fear
that the racial superiority of the West could and would be lost by a mixing
of Eastern with Western blood.
Life Negation and the Indianization of the "East"
World War I was a brutal and terrifying shock to West European
countries who suffered a considerable loss of men, resources and money.
Among the lesser noticed losses were a sense of national well being and
purpose and that simplistic faith in the idea of progress. Nevertheless,
war's end found Western dominance persisting in the East in the familiar
guise of imperial rule and colonialism. Greenberger calls this period
between the wars an ' 'era of self-doubt" for the British in which the entire
imperial experience was questioned. In fact, in some circles, it was not
merely questioned but violently attacked. Interestingly enough, the critics Greenberger refers to attacked imperialism not for the harm it did to
Oriental peoples and their cultures, but for its demoralizing impact on
Western civilization.
Most British writers, Greenberger asserts, turned a deaf ear to the
Indian nationalists argument that the contemporary Orient was not so
much the creation of decadent civilizations held together by inhumane
and corrupt traditions as it was the tragic result of colonialist oppression.
Hinduism, in particular, was singled out as the most dangerously abusive
and irrational of all Oriental belief systems. E. M. Forster's highlyacclaimed Passage to India which was first published in 1924, is perhaps
the case in point illustrating the fact that even the most sensitive and
intelligent of novelists was not immune to the prejudicial attitudes of his
time. On the surface, this is the story of an alleged rape of an Englishwoman by a Muslim in a cave somewhere in Western India. Actually,
the novel deals with the deadly impact of Hindu negation on British
character. Forster's cave was no mere backdrop, according to Greenberger, but a symbol representing "the sudden intrusion of timelessness,
17
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the horror of absolute vacuum in which human ambition, love, hate, even
religion vanish as undifferentiated particles down an eternal drain."
To Greenberger, the attitudes of Kipling and Forster to the Hindu
menace were not dissimilar. The difference was that Kipling's heroes
resisted negation and ended their India tours still reaffirming their "faith
in progress and the value of Western civilization." But Forster's
characters are too fascinated by the cave and in the end "embrace their
negation." Stanley Cooperman, who has compared Kipling and Forster as imperialist writers, feels the same way. Forster's Europeans succumb to Indianization because they lack the "moral will" of an earlier
generation.
By Indianization, the British seem to mean Hinduization. It is the
Hindus who have been exposed as the carriers of the deadly metaphysical
disease known as life negation. Forster himself accepted Indian Muslims
as being closer to the Western ideal. Nirad Chaudhuri believes that all the
Hindus are presented in Passage to India ' 'either as perverted, clownish,
or queer characters." Even Dr. Godbole, Forster's chief Hindu character, and the novel's mouthpiece of Hinduism, is, in Chaudhuri's view,
"not an exponent of Hinduism but a clown." On the other hand, the
book's most rational Indian and chief Indian character, Aziz, is a Muslim. Lawrence Brander, who has also written on Forster, made the
following comparison about Hindus and Muslims in Passage:
19

20

21

1

22

23

The first two parts of the novel are Muslim and Forster gets inside his Muslim
characters with ease, for the Muslim is completely our brother, an exaggeration of
our best selves. The difficulty comes in the third part when he deals with the
Hindus.
m

Hinduphobia was, of course, a more characteristic response of the
British who from the time James Mill published his History of British
India in 1819, were continually articulating their ambivalence about their
Indian connection. In Germany it had been otherwise. Then in the period
following World War I, the Germans began to stress the life negational
aspect of Hindu thought. The influential sociologist, Max Weber, was
convinced that among Orientals, Hindus were exceedingly other worldly
in their religion. They saw life as an abode of transient and meaningless
drives from which an individual spent a lifetime achieving liberation. In
the West, on the contrary, since the Protestant Reformation, people
worked to better themselves and the world around them; to improve the
world was worthwhile because it was a manifestation of God's purpose.
Weber's dialectic between East and West was between the alleged Hindu
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol15/iss15/3
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gnosticism which rejected the world with a passion, and the Protestant
Ethic which passionately transformed the world into an instrument for
human salvation."
Albert Schweitzer argued rather much the same thing about Hinduism
in his famous treatise on Indian Thought and Its Development (1936). As
a dedicated missionary in Africa, Schweitzer was mostly concerned
about the contrast between the Christian ethic of doing positive good in
the world and the Indian ethic (both Hindu and Buddhist) which denied
the value of such conduct since the ' 'world is meaningless and sorrowful. " Only on the surface, he believed, did Christianity resemble Indian
thought as an ideology of life negation. Said Schweitzer:
2 4

Jesus does not preach the inactive ethic of perfecting the self alone, but active,
enthusiastic love of one's neighbor. It is because His ethic contains the principle
of activity that it has affinity with world and life affirmation.
25

There were at least two noteworthy departures from nineteenth century
German biases in Schweitzer. First, he repudiated race as a significant
variable in the comparative history of East and West. The Indian Aryans
may have invented the concept of life negation whereas Aryans
elsewhere believed just the opposite. Secondly, if many European
thinkers redeemed the Muslims as non-Orientals, Schweitzer redeemed
the Chinese as exponents of the principle of world and life affirmation.
On the other hand, the reference in both cases was to a Weltanschauung
of life affirmation in pristine Islam and Confucianism that was undefiled
by Hindu contact and influence.
Interestingly enough, the idea that India was the source of all that
Westerners feared and hated about the East was not only the belief of
many Europeans during this period, but was commonly used as a rationalization for historic decline by Asians themselves. Indianization became
a convenient scapegoat both for South Asian Muslims and for Chinese
Neo-Confucian intellectuals. The Muslims blamed Hinduism and the
Chinese blamed Buddhism for crippling their respective civilizations
with the metaphysical disease of life negation. Neither Islam nor Confucianism was held responsible for Western dominance in Asia. Had both
civilizations not been contaminated by the two pernicious forms of
Indianization, the Islamic world and China could have developed their
potential and become progressive partners to Western nations.
Hu Shih, a professor of philosophy at the National University of
Peking, was one of the more articular members of precisely this kind of
scapegoat school of Chinese renascent theory. His article on "The
Indianization of China" for a Harvard University Tercentenary volume
26
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on comparative world history, is perhaps the best historiographical study
of this sort. The article appeared in 1937 when Chinese coastal cities were
being ravaged by Japanese armies. The Japanese rape of Shanghai
seemed the ultimate of humiliating experiences by industrial powers
which had continued unabated for over a century. The Revolution of 1911
seemed to have gone nowhere. China remained impotent.
The article by Hu Shih purported to do two things: demonstrate that
Oriental history in China was not indigenously Chinese and that China
has had an historical development comparable with that of the West. Hu
Shih's main thesis was that China underwent Indianization rather much as
Europe underwent Christianization. Buddhism was China's Christianity
and it changed China's culture drastically. Said Hu Shih about the more
important "items of belief and practice" that poured from India by land
and by sea into China:

The ideas that the world is unreal, of life as painful and empty, of sex as unclean,
of the family as an impediment to spiritual attainment, of celibacy and mendicancy . . . of almsgiving . . . of love extended to all sentient beings, of vegetarianism, of rigid forms of acesticism, of words and spells as having miraculous
power. . . . These are only a few drops in that vast flux of Indian religious and
cultural invasion.
28

Hu Shih denied the common historical assertion that Buddhism was
easily "uprooted" in China by "persecution." "It continued to be the
greatest religion in China," argued Hu Shih, and even now "continues to
Indianize Chinese life, thought, and institutions." China's only hope
was to inaugurate a movement akin to the European Renaissance and
structured along the lines of a "re-interpretation of the pre-Buddhist
heritage" The quest for the authentic Chinese tradition had to be
wedded to the progressive currents of thought and values of the West.
The objective of the Chinese Renaissance was to liberate the civilization
from the stranglehold of Oriental life and world negation by which India
had diverted China from her proper course of history. In Hu Shih's own
words:
29

30

31

With the new aids of modern science and technology, and of the new social and
historical sciences, we are confident that we may yet achieve a rapid liberation
from the two thousand years' cultural domination by India.
32

Life Negation in the Modern West and Life
Affirmation in the Traditional East

In the era following World War II, there was the intellectual tendency
in the United States to disavow the adventurous spirit of the Faustian man
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol15/iss15/3
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of the West and to reevaluate life negation in the East as a positive
ideology of salvation for a world continually on the brink of some
ultimate disaster. Modern warfare, the explosion of nuclear devices,
environmental pollution and the pursuit of loneliness in Western life,
suggested to an alienated intelligentsia that the Orient may have been
right all along and that it was the West which had taken the wrong road to
oblivion.
Stephen Hay has shown in his Asian Ideas of East and West (1970) that
the idea of the West being in a state of spiritual and moral crisis was a
common reaction among the Asian intelligentsia from India to Japan.
Even Anglophiles such as Keshub Chandra Sen and Rabindranath Tagore in British India, recoiled with horror from the excesses of Western
militarism and imperialism at the turn of the twentieth century." From
their vantage point in the colonies, and long before Spengler, Asian
intellectuals saw the idea of progress as an illusion and Western civilization in a serious state of decline.
But the faith in Positivism persisted among the Western elites. Then in
the wake of two world wars, Hitlerism, Stalinism, Hiroshima, the faith
began to crumble as ambivalence in the West set in. Younger people
redirected their quest for truth eastward to an alleged profusion of alternative attitudes about the ends of human existence. Oddly enough, at the
same time that the West readied itself for Zen Buddhism, Yoga classes
and the influx of gurus from India, Asians prepared themselves for the
great leap forward into the age of high technology.
In Psychotherapy East and West (1961), Alan Watts spoke for a
generation of disillusioned Westerners who could no longer equate twentieth century modernity with life affirmation. Thanks to Watt's popularization of Asian thought, the East ceased to be symbolic of all that the
West dreaded about the Orient. It was no longer exotic, inscrutable,
occult, life or world denying. The East became the true source of eternal
wisdom. The great ideas were no longer monopolized in quotations from
the intellectual forerunners of the modern West, but were increasingly
found in the once-maligned sacred texts of Hinduism, Buddhism and
Taoism.
In this particular book on psychotherapy, Watts viewed himself as the
Columbus of the psyche who had discovered in the sacred texts of the
East a new world full of promise for liberating humanity from anxiety and
neuroses. The Western psychiatric idea that therapy was equal to social
adjustment, was to Watts comparable to believing that the earth was flat.
Buddhism, Vedantism and Yoga were not religions of escapism but
33

34

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1986

11

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 15 [1986], No. 15, Art. 333

critiques of orthodox systems or cultures. Eastern mystics were reformers
of the human condition and rebels against all organized attempts to
repress the human spirit. They were dangerous to the defenders of the
status quo because they exposed the causal connection between human
suffering and false norms and values imposed by rigid institutional
structures. Watts believed that the term "maya," for example, or "illusion," represented a critical concept which had been greatly misunderstood in the West. It did not mean that the world was unreal but that the
artificial world-conception of a culture was an illusion. In the following
quotation, Watts spelled out what he understood as maya in relation to the
central idea of Eastern psychotherapy:
The aim of a way of liberation is not the destruction of maya but seeing it for what
it is, or seeing through it . . . ideas of the world and of oneself which are social
conventions and institutions are not to be confused with reality. The rules of
communication are not necessarily the rules of the universe, and man is not the
role of identity which society thrusts upon him.
35

Watts not only intended to transform the image of life negation into a
positive idea of social criticism and individual self-realization, but he
tried also to change the image of the practitioner from passive, life
denying ascetic to Promethean hero who resists social oppression to
liberate the human psyche. This brought Watts into conflict with Freud
and Freudians over the dubious concept of the Nirvana-principle. In
Freud's view, the change of consciousness and personality effected in
Eastern ways of liberation brought about "depersonalization" or "regression to an infantile mode of awareness. " Freud's Nirvana-principle
was another way of reducing Eastern liberation to life negation. The
Oriental's quest for Nirvana which literally means extinction represented
"the longing for return to the oceanic consciousness of the womb."
Destroying his ego was tantamount to burning his bridge to society and
social responsibility.
Watts refused to accept the Freudian notion that the search for wholeness in nature or the universe was necessarily a negative act of regression.
"Our mistake has been," said Watts, "to suppose that the individual is
honored and his uniqueness enhanced by emphasizing his separation
from the surrounding world, or his eternal difference in essence from his
Creator." When one looks at "the lively and varied features . . . of
Chinese and Japanese paintings . . . the ideal personality here shown is
anything but the collective nonentity or the weakling ego dissolving back
into the womb."
3 6
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The Americanization of Eastern Studies
Among the establishment academics in America researching and
teaching Asia, the 1960s was an exciting decade of easily procured grants
to support a wide variety of projects in the humanities and the social
sciences. It can be truly said that Americans took Asia very seriously and
indepednet India, in particular, was overrun by a generation of linguistically competent regional specialists.
In the United States, the intense intellectual concern for Asian area
studies only came after the demise of Western empires in the East. The
fact is that Asian studies in American education itself underwent a
national liberation struggle for autonomous recognition in the university
curriculum. To study India, for example, before the 1950s, one had to
take courses in British Empire or the Expansion of the West. Moreover,
the United States had become a world power and the challenge by the
Soviet Union in the 1950s seemed to accentuate the need for cultivating
Asian language and area studies. Government support for crucial languages that only a few Americans knew, justified in the name of national
defense, accelerated the process of deepening American scholarly interest in the East.
Americans entered the Asian field as individuals from a diversity of
backgrounds, disciplines, and purposeful commitment to given culture
areas. There were former missionaries who had served in China or India
and the sons of missionaries. World War II intelligence officers who had
served in the China-India-Burma theater, and a legion of anthropologists,
political scientists and economists who saw Asia as a golden opportunity
to test out fashionable theories on acculturation, charismatic leadership
and modernization."
Though the older generation of Americans were scientifically
oriented, the younger scholars tended to approach Asia as cultural relativists and structuralists. The reason was that most of the grant money
available for students was designed to train language and area specialists.
It should come as no surprise that these very specialists ultimately shaped
the American conception of Asia which if the truth were known, is no
conception at all. Language and area studies destroyed much of the older
interest and focus on the international monoliths such as Asia and the
West. Attention was now concentrated, not infrequently fora lifetime, on
intracivilized regional and local societies and cultures. The assault had
begun in earnest to level the macro conception of Asia and leave it as ruin
for future archeologists of human consciousness. In its place were being
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constructed a pluralistic universe where diversity was king and where
Asia was proliferated into an endless number of cultural units, each being
shaped by a scholar who endowed it with its own intregrity and history.
The problem of unity and diversity in the American approach to Asia
was very much in evidence early in the 1960s when the Committee of
Oriental Studies at Columbia University organized a conference on this
subject and invited the very best Asianists to participate. The transactions
were later published as Approaches to Asian Civilizations which was an
apt title because it suggested that diversity was a more fitting way to
approach Asia among Americans and that its convenors and editors
believed it important to express as many different attitudes and methods
as were possible.
The book is significant from the viewpoint of East-West encounter in
the manner that the problem was ignored or dismissed. Only one of
twenty-nine scholars even bothered to address himself to it. To be sure,
the universalist attitude of the social scientist was present in the papers
given by William Lockwood and Daniel Lerner. But they were out of
place because they seemed far more concerned with abstract models of
tradition and modernity as they related to an anticipated homogenized
world in the future, than with discrete culture patterns in Asia.
Only Karl Wittfogel in his article on "Ideas and the Power Structure,"
appeared willing to carry on the historiographical tradition of differentiating the East from the West. In the past, as we have seen, macro studies
of the East and West invariably meant macro level generalizations.
Wittfogel was no exception. In the article which was based on his
Oriental Despotism, Wittfogel argued that the power structure was the
unifying factor in all Asian empires. From ancient times, said Wittfogel,
' 'Western observers have been struck by the extraordinary strength of the
state in 'Asia'." Oriental despotism, in sharp contrast to the democratic
West, can be traced back historically to the earliest attempts to control
and maintain vast irrigation systems which were essential to produce the
food surplus upon which the agriculturally-based civilizations depended
for survival.
In the United States today Wittfogel's idea of hydraulic despotism, like
F.S.C. Northrop's idea of the "undifferentiated aesthetic continuum"
which he has treated as a core concept in the Asian mind, have become
relics of a past which Americans have largely rejected. At the Columbia
conference, the comparative approach was still a matter of debate.
Ainslie Embree who commented on Wittfogel's paper, argued for the
q
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need of "great intellectual constructs," but then cautioned that these
conceptual schemes "could prove so entrancing" that they would "be
accepted with uncritical enthusiasm." In another paper, Arthur Wright
warned that if we became too comparative about China and the world, we
would lose the distinction between what was "Chinese history" and what
was "metahistory." This angered F.L.K. Hsu who challenged
Wright's "negativism" and argued that if "each civilization were
unique, then we could learn nothing from history or ethnography, and we
will be forced to throw the sciences of man into the river." Richard
Lambert, South Asian sociologist and one of the forerunners of the
language and area programs in the United States, proved to be prophetic
about what he called the ' 'uniquist" approach to the study of Asia. In his
own words:
44

45

46

This term implies something more than the fact that each of us tends to be working
on only one area, it implies the belief that the culture we are studying is in many
ways unique. Light is to be shed upon one aspect of the culture by probing more
deeply into its unique setting. In contrast to the comparativist realm where the
grand system builder is king, in the ranks of the uniquist, the man with the greatest
depth of erudition in the smallest fragment of a single culture reigns supreme.
47

McNeill's History of the Human Community:
Europe and Asia Joined at Last

It should surprise no one that America's only supreme efffort at writing
comparative history on the grand scale, William McNeill's Rise of the
West, was the least philosophical of any world history ever written.
McNeill was Toynbee's nephew but as world historians, there was no
intellectual kinship between the two. McNeill's preface to what he
subtitled a "History of the Human Community," was mostly composed
of apologies for shortcomings and a list of acknowledgements. There was
no introduction and the conclusion was simply an extension of the
narrative in which predictions were made for the future cosmopolitan
world order.
It is little wonder that McNeill has been so respected among American
historians. His book was immensely rich in detail; every argument was
amply documented from the best sources found in dozens of historiographical traditions; the style was lucid and never obscured by flights of
poetic imagination or philosophic discourse. There was a judicious
choice of maps, charts and illustrations. The methodology was so impeccable from a professional historian's point of view, that it seemed
hardly possible that McNeill was writing a history of the world.
48
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Nevertheless, The Rise of the West has a conceptual framework and
has contributed historiographically to the problem of East-West encounter. First, McNeill, the diffusionist, followed a technological device, religious inspiration, philosophic idea or aesthetic creation from
civilization to civilization in order to demonstrate that the historical
modification of any of these culture complexes was largely a result of
intercivilizational interaction. For McNeill therefore the idea that high
cultures were afforded the luxury of pursuing essentially independent
careers was a myth. Secondly, there was no East or West but a Eurasian
community of civilizations from the Mediterranean Sea or later, Atlantic
Ocean, to the China Sea. Eurasian history was a history of critical
interrelations from the beginnings of recorded time to the present.
Finally, McNeill concerned himself with the great movements which
have arisen from time to time in one civilization or another such as
Hellenism, Buddhism and Islam. The point here is not that they have all
been cross cultural in impact but that each has disturbed the balance of the
Eurasian community of cultures, although only relatively so. The significance of the rise of Western Europe since the sixteenth century was that,
for the first time, one of the civilizations became so powerful that it
ultimately dominated the others.
Though McNeill paid occasional lip service to such terms as the Orient
and the Occident, and despite the use of "West" in his title, the book has
been purged of most of the older stereotypes. The relentless flux of
history from Europe to East Asia which McNeill depicted in all its
majestic fury, had at last swept away the more dubious images of the
earlier imperalist era.
From East and West to North and South
American scholars have no doubt radically altered the traditional
perspective on the East-West encounter. Whether guilty of academic
imperialism in Asia or not, no one would deny that they have produced a
set of new verifiable generalizations on discrete cultures from a wealth of
hard data. Many Americans feel they have made authentic discoveries
because they have approached other cultures as insiders learning to speak
and behave like natives. Americans have even carried anthropological
relativism to its ultimate and in the process, some believe, transcended
the imperialist ethos and finally laid to rest the persisting and, often,
pernicious myth of East and West.
But myths and ideas die hard unless the conditions which produced
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol15/iss15/3
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them also disappear. Even if the conditions disappear, persisting perceptions may not. Symbols which have been discarded by scholars may still
be usefully manipulated for political reasons. In 1978, for example, a
book appeared on Orientalism which was written by a professor of
comparative Western literature who also happened to be a highly
politicized and militant Palestinian. For Edward Said, the author, the
encounter between East and West was still very much alive first because
of the Israelis, and secondly, because the so-called Oriental cultures of
today were perverted creations by the West to maintain its world dominance. Said did not believe that imperialism ended with the fall of West
European empires in Asia; on the contrary, America and her Asian
scholars have extended it with new forms of dominance and myth-making
about Orientals.
Said, and angry man, has used or misused "Orientalism" as a sewer
category for all the intellectual rubbish Westerners have exercised in the
global marketplace of ideas. Though Westernized, he admitted that he
never "lost hold of the cultural reality of, the personal involvement in
having been constituted as an Oriental." It is precisely because men
like Said feel that their identity has been lost in the network of Western
myths and illusions created out of the East, that they have revived the
myth of East-West polarity/ As with V.S. Naipaul, also an eloquent and
sophisticated Westernized writer, Edward Said's quest for the true Asia is
a projection of his own identity crisis.
More recently, East and West, though no longer identified as such,
have been seen from a new perspective. The fact that Japan has become
the equal of any Western nation or that China has won enormous respect
for her potential power, seems to suggest that older political and
economic disparities between the West and the East are becoming increasingly meaningless. The disparities between higher and lower standards of living, military strength, industrialism and high technology seem
much more evident between North and South than between West and
East. Japan, China, the Soviet Union, Europe and North America
constitute the North whereas Southeast and South Asia, West Asia and
Africa, Central and Latin America constitute the South. In 1980 a new
periodical was published from London called South which not only
incorporated the idea but claimed for itself to be "The Third World
Magazine."
South, for all its attempts to articulate a new position in world affairs,
cannot betray the fact that the object of its wrath remains the West which
is still, as always, the source of all the evils that plague the have-not
49
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nations. It is only the East which has seemingly disappeared but has
actually been absorbed in a larger community of peoples, cultures and
nations who share in common an acute sense of frustration at having
remained backward and undeveloped. The editorials and articles in South
suggest that the Third World cannot accept the fact that the privileged
fraternity of Western nations now includes the Soviet Empire and Japan,
with China standing at the door for admission. Seemingly, just as the
West used the East as a scapegoat to explain its own alleged decline
following World War I, the Third World now uses the West as a
scapegoat for its own inability to achieve modernization in our own time.
University of Minnesota
NOTES
a. For an excellent example of this in the precise context of East-West encounter, see C.N. Parkinson, East and West (New York: Mentor Book, 1965),
pp. 53-56.
b. For a complete list of Greek virtues supposedly unique to themselves, see
Parkinson, East and West, pp. 57-68.
c. For Jawaharlal Nehru, an Indian freedom fighter who wrote a world history
in a British prison, the superiority of Greek culture which Herodotus "referred
to" was based on a sense of individual freedom which when practised, made the
Greeks supermen. J. Nehru, Glimpses of World History (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1962), p. 17.
d. It is fashionable, today, to use Herodotus as a source but cautiously and in
conjunction with other sources. William McNeill's judgment is among the most
balanced I have seen. He reprimands Herodotus for exaggerating the contrast
between Greeks and Persians and for his tendency to be vague and confusing at
times. Nevertheless, McNeill concludes about "the interpretation of facts" by
Herodotus that "despite its transparent bias, it still dominates scholarship."
W.H. McNeill, The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. 202, 256n, 268.
e. For the classic text on Hellenism, see W.W. Tarn, Hellenistic Civilization
(New York: Meridian Books, 1966).
f. The subject is thoroughly discussed in B. Gafurov, et a\.,Kushan Studies in
U.S.S.R. (Calcutta: Indian Studies, 1970).
g. See Radhakrishnan's excellent discussion of this in S. Radhakrishnan,
Eastern Religions and Western Thought (New York: Galaxy Book, 1959), pp.
186-7.
h. For a monograph on British Orientalism, see D. Kopf, British Orientalism
and the Bengal Renaissance (Berkeley: University of California, 1969).
i. Voltaire's writings on Asia include Fragments on some Revolutions in and
on the death of Count de Lalli (1773); his Essay on the Customs and the spirit of
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol15/iss15/3
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the nations (1765) which has several long sections on India; and his History of the
Age of Louis XIV which contains much material on seventeenth century Europe
and Asia. Schopenhauer's references to Buddhism can be found in his The World
as Will and Idea.
j. Gobineau's The Inequality of the Human Races (1853) is discussed in A.
Aronson, Europe Looks at India A Study in Cultural Relations (Bombay: Hind
Kitabs, 1945), pp. 87-93. For his influence on Nietzsche, see Aronson, pp.
102-104.
k. Kipling, "The Ballad of East and West," quoted in A.J. Greenberger, The
British Image of India (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 11.
1. S. Cooperman quoted in Greenberger, The British Image of India.
m. L. Brander quoted in Greenberger, The British Image of India, p. 129.
n. For an excellent study of Weber in the macro context of comparative
sociology which discusses precisely this problem, see G.R. Madan, Western
Sociologists on Indian Society (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), pp.
225-251.
o. For a study of Sen and Tagore along these lines, see D. Kopf, The Brahmo
Samaj and the Shaping of the Modern Indian Mind (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 249-310.
p. Many of these persons collaborated in publishing the first syllabi on Indian
Civilization. See Introduction to the Civilization of India (Chicago: Syllabus
Division, University of Chicago, 1957).
q. For an exhaustive study on how Bengali regionalism in South Asia studies
developed in the United States, see D. Kopf, "A Bibliographic Essay on Bengal
Studies in the United States," R.V.M. Baumer, e d A s p e c t s of Bengali History
and Society (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1975), pp. 200-242.
r. This was especially true of D. Lerner, "Basic Problems in the Contemporary Transformation of Traditional Societies," T. de Bary, A.T. Embree, eds.,
Approaches to Asian Civilization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964),
pp. 219-239.
s. For a more extensive analysis of Said, see D. Kopf, "Hermeneutics versus
History," The Journal of Asian Studies, XXXIX (May 1980), 495-506.
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